Archives & Special Collections

Wilkes University Archives is excited to announce that the Susquehanna Claim, 1770-1801 subseries of the Gilbert Stuart McClintock collection has been processed and digitized! Jessica Van Orden, a Senior English Literature major, has written a blog post highlighting items from the collection and providing her own analysis of the conflict. Jessica is the Editor-in-chief of the Inkwell Quarterly publication on campus and hopes one day to work within a public library as a community program coordinator. This collection and blog post was edited and supervised by Suzanna Calev, Wilkes University Archivist.

This processed and digitized subseries can be found on our Archivesspace catalog found here. 

Below is Jessica’s blog post on the subseries.

The Susquehanna Claim subseries is a collection of materials within the Gilbert Stuart McClintock special collection which focuses on the land conflict that occurred between Pennsylvanian and Connecticut settlers in the Wyoming Valley during the second half of the 18th Century. The series of events that make up this subseries go by a few names such as the Yankee-Pennamite Wars, the Pennamite-Yankee Wars, or simply the Pennamite Wars, however the Susquehanna Claim and the Susquehanna Controversy will also be used.

These materials were donated to Wilkes by Board of Trustees member Gilbert Stuart McClintock in 1959 and haven’t been processed fully until now.

Before delving into the collection itself however, it is important to explain how this controversy began, especially since, as this blog title suggests, not many people are even aware of the wars that occurred in this region.

The conflict in its entirety is centered upon Connecticut’s proposed western claim of the upper third of Pennsylvania. The debate between this ownership was born from, seemingly, a mistake made by King Charles II, as he granted the land twice. The Susquehanna Company was then formed with the intention of acting upon a grant of territory which King Charles II gifted to the state in 1662 as their population continued to grow while available land decreased. Yet while it was clear that a question of ownership hung in the air, it was Connecticut’s continued presumption of right to the land that continually stoked the sequential conflicts known as the Yankee Pennamite Wars. It is a violent history that spans nearly thirty decades, only to be soothed time and again with the desire for unity in the face of a greater task: the American Revolution.

King Charles II and the Double Grant

Connecticut’s claim can be seen in detail through a map in Figure 1.a below, as it catalogs the evolution of Pennsylvania’s borders. The map in Figure 1.b depicts the manner in which Connecticut’s resources were dwindling while their population continued to grow. This congestion of land is what prompted their aggressive move westward.

The maps highlight the ways in which Connecticut sought to expand their western reach to support their growing population, and further marks many influential landmark moments that stoked the tensions brewing between the states, such as the development of Westmoreland County. As land became more congested, the necessity to procure new, viable land to support that growth spurred the hands of the Susquehanna Company. The Susquehanna Company’s papers describe the group’s sole motivation to “acquire land under Connecticut title in what is now northeastern Pennsylvania” (National Archives). The pages detail this formulating plan through personal and professional documents such as letters, minutes of meetings, and resolutions of the Connecticut Assembly (National Archives). The issue with this grant to Connecticut, however, is that nearly two decades later, in 1681, King Charles II accidentally granted the same land to Sir William Penn.

While it may seem odd, a King supplying the same plot of land to two different state representatives over the course of two decades, it makes more sense in the historical context of King Charles II’s ascension to the crown. Charles II brought about the Restoration in England, marking the return of the monarchy and a renewed expectation of royalist ideology. Moreover, Charles II, newly restored to the throne, sought to make the most profit that he could from the North American colonies, regardless of the impact on the colonies themselves. In this early moment, we can see the heart of the American Revolution ideology brewing, for it became a question of royal decree vs. governing rule. This appears in depth within the ways in which the two states respond to the grant by Charles, for Connecticut’s actions align more with the perception of the King’s word being inherently true while Pennsylvania continually engages with the governing systems of the American colonies.  

Strangely enough, this was not the sole occurrence of a double grant of this particular land made to the Connecticut and Pennsylvania settlers, for they were both sold the land by the Six Nations as well. The Six Nations, also known as the Iroquois Confederacy or the Iroquois League, were a collective of six indigenous tribes along northern New York state. They are considered to have held an influential presence amid the struggle between France and Britain for dominion in North America. 

The Iroquois had first sold the land to Connecticut through the Susquehanna Company in 1754. The Iroquois Land Deed of 1754 offers an interesting insight into the underhanded tactics of language wielded by the Susquehanna Company, for it is imbued with notions of inherent right and its benefits greatly favor the English settlers when compared to the tribes of the Six Nations. However, the Iroquois perspective is detailed within the language of the document, as well. The Iroquois voice underscored a recognition of the English settlers’ applications for purchasing the land, rather than relying upon the royal decree of the King, who sought to maintain amiable relationships and healthy trade with the Six Nations.

Unlike the future Pennsylvania purchase, this contract was devised under secrecy. The Susquehanna Company sought to influence the bid of the representative party during the Albany Conference, the Mohawks, while said party sought to monopolize on land that they themselves had no formal claim to (University of Pittsburgh). The land was thus purchased for 2,000 pounds. You can view the document in full in The University of Pittsburgh’s digital archive.

The University of Pittsburgh’s archive notes that, while the Susquehanna Company is not explicitly named within the document, the research conducted on the parties involved in the letter “discerns that this was the colonial party responsible” for the creation of the contract and the “purchase of the Wyoming Valley” (University of Pittsburgh). An enlarged section of the document allows us to see the direct address of the “Colony of Connecticut” in the sale. 

The same lands were then sold once more to Pennsylvania in 1769, when the Six Nations met with Thomas Penn and Richard Penn. The two men purchased the land deed through Sir William Johnson Baronet, the British Superintendent of Indian Affairs. The Pennsylvania purchase was conducted with more transparency and candor than that of the earlier purchase by the Susquehanna Company, and its language, while more concise, offers a greater tone of equality between the two parties. The sum of the land has even increased as we can see within the document below:

Pennsylvania agreed to pay the Six Nations $10,000 dollars for the land named. This process also aligned with burgeoning British authority which sought to prevent further conflict between the British colonies, and their settlers, with the indigenous populations present. This process appears conflicting when we see the mass emigration that the indigenous tribes faced after having conducted this deal, for most had dispersed, moving more northward to Canada or more westward. It holds the intention of engendering peace while still privileging the British colonies in the end.

The lands themselves also hold a further dynamic when considering that Sir William Johnson is included in the Pennsylvania purchase, for they are the same lands that had been ceded by the Six Nations during the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768. The intention of the treaty was to redesign the boundary line between the Thirteen colonies and the indigenous tribes enacted by the Royal Proclamation of 1763. It was the hope that establishing a new boundary would quell the rampant conflict between the two. The land treaty was signed between the Six Nations and Sir William Johnson, who held personal motivations such as opening land and expanding trade. The lands spanned most of the modern day Kentucky, Tennessee, West Virginia, Maryland, but most importantly to the Controversy, western Pennsylvania. 

Thus, the controversy between who owns the land has been a long and convoluted one, extending back before the Connecticut and Pennsylvania settler cognizance, but the tone of the confusion reigns prominent. 

The Early Movements and Forts Forty and Durkee

By the late 1760s, the Susquehanna Company established several strongholds across the stretch of land bordering the Susquehanna River such as Forty Fort and Fort Durkee. The two forts played an influential role within the developing tensions leading to the First Yankee Pennamite war, for they acted as Connecticut’s first true challenge of the land in question. While they had held the grant from the king for many decades, it was the challenge by William Penn’s grant that moved them into action. These strongholds allowed them to secure their footing in the land moving into the early 1770s, where they established several towns named Hanover (1770), Pittston (1770), Kingston (ca. 1771), Plymouth (1772), and Westmoreland (1773) within the region. The Susquehanna Papers offer a greater insight to the development of these early townships, digitized by the HathiTrust Digitial Library.

Forty Fort, founded in 1770, was named for the first forty settlers sent by the Susquehanna Company to hold the land against all external threats. It was located high on the western banks of the Susquehanna, near the town of Kingston.

Forty Fort in its construction was incredibly dynamic, answering all plausible needs of the early settlers. However, this fort differed from others that Connecticut had built in these early years of the conflict, as it was specifically designed to serve “as a place of security in time of danger and alarm” (Pennsylvania, Indian Forts Commission). 

As these forty settlers were the first official movement of Connecticut’s presence within the Wyoming Valley, they faced a great vulnerability, not only against two well-formed powers in the region, the Six Nations and the colony of Pennsylvania, but a new environment as well. The space was composed in such a way that it came across more as a protective space for practicing battle formations as well as the intermediate moments of life that still required security and defense amid conflict. The intention of Forty Fort was to support the forty settlers in their everyday lives within a new climate while also allowing the garrison an advantage in their defense in order to hold the land.

Connecticut also began construction on another fort, Fort Durkee, immediately upon their arrival in 1769. Fort Durkee located on the eastern banks, near Wilkes Barre—near our very own Wilkes University campus. The fort was named after Major John Durkee, a Connecticut militia leader who came to be renowned for his service in the Revolutionary War. Durkee joined the original forty Connecticut settlers with more manpower, raising their number to nearly three hundred against Pennsylvania focus. Major Durkee is also the person who gave Wilkes-Barre its name, forming the name after two members of the British Parliament, John Wilkes and Isaac Barre.  Fort Durkee differed from the intentions of Forty Fort, for its construction was aimed more toward the advantages the structure could provide in battle. 

The tone of Durkee, then, is incredibly different compared to Forty Fort. While Forty Fort was still considered to be a fortress of security, a space where the settlers may remove to for “security in time[s] of danger,” it holds a more home-like quality than Fort Durkee, which is elevated for its battle prowess. Moreover, the two forts together succeeded in positioning Connecticut in their claim of the land with an upper hand and greater defense against a threat that had already established itself within the land. 

An interesting history that I noted while researching the forts was that a great deal of its initial success and power was due to the geographical location of its establishment. Both Forts were located at vital points of the Susquehanna river, granting them an endless supply of clean water, as well as the power that controls over such a resource. In the Westmoreland records detailed within the “Report of the Commission,” which surveyed and documented the histories of these Forts, Forts Forty and Durkee elevated the Connecticut position within the First war, not only through what the physical structures of the forts offered, but in the stability offered by the geographical landscape surrounding them. Forty Fort’s location was said to be “admirably situated” on the upper banks of the Susquehanna, as its location to the river itself granted them a “command  [of] the river” (Pennsylvania, Indian Forts Commission). The landscape surrounding Forty Fort says:

This is why the pattern for the two Forts mimic one another, for it is an intentional reliance on the land as both a means of security and resources as well as defense. While Forty Fort is the moniker for Connecticut’s early settlement, Fort Durkee is where the seat of conflict climaxes amid the first war.

There were a large number of forts built within the time of this conflict, by both Connecticut (Yankee) and Pennamite forces. Below is a map that details the different locations so that you may see where they are in relation to one another. 

Connecticut Forts: 
Fort Durkee (1769)
Forty Fort (1770)
The Three Pittston Stockades; 
Pittston Fort (1772)

Pennsylvania Forts:
Fort Wyoming (1771)
Fort Ogden (Ogden’s Fort) (ca. 1770)
*Sources note that Ogden’s Fort was captured and burned within the First Pennamite War in 1770. It was suceeded by a stronghold not listed above, Mill Creek Fort (1772).

Tory Control:
Wintermoot’s Fort (1776)
Fort Jenkins (Shortly following Wintermoot’s establishment, ca. 1776)
*Jenkins, being located closely in Exeter township, was thought to have been a check to Wintermoot’s power and presence.

Thus, the permanency of the two forts stoked the growing ire of Pennsylvania response by creating a tone of hierarchy, privileging Connecticut’s insistence over the question that hung in the balance: who truly held ownership of the land? These tensions eventually boil over, instigating the First Yankee Pennamite War. 

The First Yankee Pennamite War

The First Yankee Pennamite War was fought between 1769-1771, with Connecticut troops contending against Captain Amos Ogden, the Pennamite militia leader. The locations of the various forts will help in understanding the early battle plays made by the Pennamite militia in response to Connecticut’s claim on the land. While the Connecticut forces were building forts Forty and Durkee, the Pennamite’s established their own as a direct check to the threat of Fort Durkee. Fort Wyoming was built in 1771 under Ogden’s leadership with the near singular intention of reducing Fort Durkee. 

In witnessing the Susquehanna Company’s siege of the land, and the numbers that Durkee brought with him upon entering the Valley, Ogden’s men spent a great deal of effort recruiting to their numbers. Perceiving an upper hand over the men, the men of Fort Wyoming marched toward Fort Durkee. Each side held its own for a time, with conflict continuing until the capture of John Durkee by the Pennamite militia in February 1770. Zebulon Butler, Director of the Susquehanna Company, succeeded him and through allying with Lazarus Stewart and the Paxtang Boys, landed Connecticut a victory in the First War by recapturing Fort Durkee in April 1770, as well as the Pennamite Fort Wyoming in a “26 day siege” (Historical Association of Tobyhanna Township). 

Lazarus Stewart and the Paxtang Boys were Scotch-Irish Presbyterians from Lancaster County who held a deep resentment and anger toward the colony of Pennsylvania for what they felt was their disregard for the violence and trauma Pennsylvanian frontiersmen suffered during Pontiac’s war (1763-1766). The Paxtang position was a wholly violent one, often levying extreme, singular rhetoric, that left their audiences confused and acting without direction.

Due to their broad lens of retribution and action, Butler petitioned to these men, with the promise of land rewards, to assist them in recapturing the forts. With this force behind them, Butler led the men of Durkee in the capture of Fort Wyoming in April 1770. In the face of this victory, Butler reasserted the Connecticut claim on the land, even though Pennsylvania’s claim to it was largely recognized by the Continental Congress and the Six Nations. 

Zebulon Butler was an American military officer who served as a Connecticut leader within the Yankee-Pennamite Wars, as he was the Director of the Susquehanna Company from the 1750s through the 1760s, as well as the Revolutionary War within the Continental Army. His presence is largely remembered today for his command over the devastating loss against British forces in the Battle of Wyoming. However, he proved to be a powerful political voice, playing a decisive role in the brewing conflict amid the Susquehanna Controversy, as he represented the Wyoming Valley during the  Connecticut Assembly. He later went on to speak avidly for peace, assisting Timothy Pickering in counseling peace between Pennsylvanian and Connecticut settlers and the establishment of Luzerne County. 

Because of Zebulon Butler’s critical role in the Susquehanna Controversy, he, alongside his brother, is a name which comes up rather often within the collection. Those who are looking for further information on Butler, especially in relation to his role in the settling of the area, a more detailed account can be found here at the Wilkes University Archives in its own separate series, Subseries II: the Butler correspondence located here. 

Following the conclusion of the First Yankee Pennamite war in 1771, King George III directly addressed the conflict caused by the double grant of King Charles II, as he confirmed Connecticut’s claim over the land. While the tone of this address matches the movements of Connecticut thus far within the debate, granting them a royal nod to their ownership of the land, Pennsylvania is loud in their rejection of the king’s word. Even in the face of this large defeat, at the collective hands of their own people and their enemies, Pennsylvania petitioned for their voice to be heard as they continually built connections with those who could help them cement their claim. Pennsylvania worked through transparent business dealings and a claim trail that anyone saw plainly within the documentation at the time, while Connecticut physically cemented themselves within the land itself. Within the collection, item 14.01 depicts these business deals that Pennsylvania pursued to legitimize their hold within the land. 

Item 14.01: Notice from unknown, 1771 April 13

In a notice authored shortly after the king’s affirmation of Connecticut’s claim to the land, Pennsylvania’s response was to openly document the continued sales occurring within the land. In this notice from the city of Easton, PA, the creator of the manuscript authorizes the purchase and settlement of land in Wyoming, PA. The notice orders that buyers are to improve their lots which are to be mortgaged to insure payment of the purchase price. This notice highlights Pennsylvania’s continued fight for the rights of their land amid the blatant and permanent presence of Connecticut’s claim. Moreover, it reveals the difference in approach by Pennsylvania and Connecticut throughout the debate as Pennsylvania continually worked to create external bridges of support and form a paper trail in their fight for the land, while Connecticut’s approach was to occupy the land through might alone.

However, these two warring styles only succeeded in stoking the developing tensions more, leading to the Second Pennamite War. At every victory of legitimate claim and purchase Pennsylvania had made, they came to find that Connecticut had wielded that time in broadening their occupation within the land.

The Second Pennamite War

The Second Yankee Pennamite war, fought in 1775, followed similar themes of disputes between the colonies with Zebulon Butler commanding Connecticut forces against the Pennamite militia. The Second War, while brief, resulted in great loss, culminating in the Battle of Rampart Rocks on Christmas Day 1775. Butler successfully defeated the Pennamite powers under the command of William Plunkett, emboldening the Connecticut morale. That successful victory resulted in Connecticut establishing more settlements, such as the formation of Westmoreland County.

These developments emboldened not only the military might and the goals of the Susquehanna Company, but the spirit of each settler within the Connecticut counties. By establishing a permanent and stable image within the communities, the Yankee settlers became more confident in their holdings within the land. As the “Report of the Commission” states, they felt as if, for the first time, “powerful aid and protection” from the “mother colony” granted them that recognition they had been long fighting for. 

These settlements further stoked the continuation of the larger question at the heart of the debate between Connecticut and Pennsylvania: who has true ownership? As the argument over who owned the land began to erupt more boisterously, we see a pattern emerge, with Connecticut attempting to reinforce their claim on the land through action while Pennsylvania sought dialogue. Connecticut’s language held the notion of inherent rights to the land. While it is called a Controversy, it would not be amiss to say that Connecticut never truly considered it so: at least in language. In Volume 5 of the Susquehanna Company Papers (1772-1774), the Governor of Connecticut Jonathan Trumbull, says:

“So soon as the Indian Occupiers were willing to sell and remove from their land, The People of this Colony before any other & with allowance from the Authority did bona fide, purchase the same of the Indians.” Jonathan Trumbull to Richard Jackson, 3 Aug, 1772 (Sourced from The Susquehanna Company Papers, 1772-1774 Volume 5, edited by Robert J. Taylor, p.14)

 The language is important, for not only does it distance themselves from the indigenous with callous language, it positions them as rightful owners of the land, describing the Native peoples of the continent as “occupiers.” Moreover, it underscores that tone innate within Connecticut’s actions, the surety of ownership and right, by naming their settlement as one held above all in this dispute. 

Item 14.04: Booklet titled “The Right of the Governor and Company,” printed by Eben Watson, 1773.

We have an item within our collection that depicts how that voice was wielded in favor of Connecticut’s position. In item 14.04, “The Right of the Governor and Company,” a 1773 booklet printed by Eben Watson describing the arguments made at the time regarding who had rightful claim to the land. Eben’s voice is used to sway the Connecticut Assembly’s influence in favor of the Susquehanna Company’s claims on the land, and ultimately succeeded in swaying the voice of the legislature. Watson, a Connecticut native, presents a biased perspective on the Controversy and dispute, however, the specifics of its employment in this manner offers an extraordinary opportunity to see how the arguments were formed and molded during this period.

In this booklet, the author begins with an outline of previous land grants given to other states by English Royalty which have lasted hundreds of years, arguing that history should serve as a vehicle with which future claims are heard and decided. His notion is one example, where if the elements of the request fit the criteria of the mold, Connecticut’s claim on the land stands more firmly than Pennsylvania’s position.  He writes, “[i]f these examples serve as precedent, what makes Connecticut’s grant different?” Eben’s argument, then, ultimately relies upon the notion that the law can never grow, the council’s gaze must never be altered. Their position stands solely on the fact that King Charles II had granted them the land first on page nine of the text:

The “both sides of Delaware River” statement is referring to the land granted to them by the King which the Susquehanna’s controversy is centered around. Although the state claimed to own the land, they would not act upon it for almost an entire century, with the formation of the Susquehanna Company sometime within the mid-eighteenth century.

This becomes clearer as Eben directly connects his opening argument towards the notions of precedent, and the realities of this double grant. On page 20-21 of the text, Eben writes:

This is the heart of the conflict that devolved into the consecutive and cyclical nature of the Yankee Pennamite Wars. The heart of the conflict is that there is only one tract of land, yet two growing settlements who rely upon the promise of stability it grants. In the brewing tone of independence stoked by the might of the American Revolution, the tensions building between Pennsylvania and Connecticut can only be expected to have erupted in violence during the period. These repeated and conflicting claims on the territory, as well as the secretive developing settlements caused the tension to ultimately erupt. 

A Momentary Shift Following the Battle of Wyoming

It is not until the Battle of Wyoming that we see a significant shift towards unity, for, in the face of Britain’s greater threat to American Independence, the Continental Congress attempts to reframe the conflicting identities to a singular purpose: the revolution. 

On July 3rd of 1778, Pennsylvanian loyalists teamed up with the British and Iroquois to lay siege to the Connecticut settlement Fort Wyoming. The Pennsylvania loyalists who were involved in this massacre saw the siege as an opportunity to drive out the opposing settlers who they saw as bargaining pieces to placate the crown in their victory. Colonel John Butler led a troop of nearly one thousand comprised of loyalists and Iroquois allies.

As the Revolution had called most of the valley’s men to the front lines, those who remained in the valley were mostly women and children. Zebulon Butler, along with three-hundred and seventy-five men, left Forty Fort to meet the advancing group. In seeing the opposing line take form, Colonel John Butler set Fort Wintermoot on fire with the following call to do the same at Fort Jenkins. The battle devastated the men of Forty Fort, with Colonel John Butler’s troop having killed or captured over three-hundred men, women, and children of the valley. Colonel John Butler agreed to the release of the remaining men on the ground that they would not fight for the American interest in the Revolutionary war. Zebulon Butler’s great loss at the Battle of Wyoming left Connecticut’s claim to the land vulnerable, as well as the growing social awareness of the disputed claim.

News of the violence and brutality inflicted upon Durkee’s settlers came to be known widely and was utilized as a tool to sow unity among the states as it distinguished the loyalists from the patriots. This is where we see the slight shift in tone surrounding the land debate between Connecticut and Pennsylvania, for external influences are entreating them to put aside their lesser concerns for the good of the nation as a whole.

In his paper presented before the Canisteo Valley Historical Society in March 1891, titled, “The Wyoming Massacre,” Milo M. Acker, an American lawyer and politician, utilizes language that focuses on solidarity following the Battle of Wyoming. Though the document was written over a century later, we can see how politicians of the nineteenth century saw the importance of language in the American Revolution, and continued to wield that comprehension in the frame of America’s fight for liberty and unity. Acker’s descriptive language shifts the tension long felt within the Valley away from an internal conflict toward an external one by engendering the concept of a unified American identity. 

The emotional framework that we see here in Acker’s work may present a similar tone to one fashioned in the months and years following the Battle of Wyoming, where in the aftermath of incomprehensible violence and grief, external parties sought to unify the tensions between the two states—even briefly—to contend with those who would seek to hold them beneath their thumb. The settlers become a singular unit, protective of the Valley and their dream of a free country, against those who seek to intrude upon it.

Acker’s recounting of the events that led to the Battle of Wyoming reveal an interpretation of these shifting priorities and highlights, potentially, the first internal moment of peace felt within the Valley since the tensions born in 1769, as the states come together to battle their larger enemy: Britain. However, the tensions, once home, rekindle with a growing need for solutions to old problems. With the question having been left long unanswered and a shiny new governing system to petition, Connecticut and Pennsylvania bring the matter before the Continental Congress.  

The Birth of a Government and The Decree of Trenton

The final, Third Yankee Pennamite war is perhaps the most complex, as it spans various moments of critique and solution as well as violence and talks of peace. It can only be expected, as the country is in its infancy and attempting to navigate a conflict that has been wrestled with for nearly fifteen years by the time that the Continental Congress rules in Pennsylvania’s favor in 1782. Following the Revolutionary War, on November 12, 1782, the Continental Congress gathered in Trenton, New Jersey to hear the case between Connecticut and Pennsylvania.

In enacting the Decree of Trenton, the newly formed United States government ruled in favor that Pennsylvania had been and was the true right’s holder of the land. The decree was issued under Article IX of the Articles of the Confederation, giving Pennsylvania sole jurisdiction of the land. With the unanimous decision, Connecticut renounced all of its political representatives within the Wyoming Valley, specifically those in Westmoreland County.

However, it is with this final, comprehensive recognition of Pennsylvania’s legitimacy to the land that we once again see a shift in the tone and motivations occurring within the Valley. While Pennsylvania had worked through conversation, mitigation, and transparency while advocating for their right to the land before this final Decree, their actions following this decision followed a similar pattern witnessed within Connecticut’s actions leading up to this moment. Though the Decree had granted them jurisdiction alone, Pennsylvania would seek further control of the lands as they returned home. For while they initially recognized the limited scope of the Decree, they expanded upon its nature as “not only as a settlement of the jurisdiction but also of the titles to the land” once they felt secure in their hold of the land (Gnitchel).

Through the Decree of Trenton, Pennsylvania sought to remove all Connecticut settler presence within the land. They considered that the Decree enabled them to rule that Connecticut settlers “were not citizens of the Commonwealth, could not vote, and were to give up their property claims” (Luzerne County). The decision continued to be contested by Connecticut though, amplifying present and historical tensions, and resulting in the Third Pennamite War in 1784. Under the command of Colonel John Franklin, Connecticut soldiers went to war against the Pennamite militia being led by Northampton County Justice of the Peace, Alexander Patterson. 

Similar to the tactics set about following the Battle of Wyoming, Pennsylvania weaponized their language in order to justify the action they were taking against the Connecticut settlers. They painted them as unreachable, stating that there was no amity to be reached with them following the Decree’s recognition of Pennsylvania ownership. We have a report that demonstrates this argument being posited by Pennsylvania. 

Item 14.06: Report from unknown, 1783 September 2.

In the report, the Pennamite Committee writes to the Court to explain the building tensions within the settlements. The author writes that the Connecticut settlers are incredibly hostile toward the Pennamite settlers and that settling within the land or securing the sale of that land would be impossible. They conclude that their “hopes of a friendly compromise seem now vanished.” 

However, I found it interesting that while the author of the letter is seeking support for repealing a former act, “An Act to Prevent and Stay Suits from Being Brought Against the Inhabitants of Wyoming During the Time Therein Mentioned,” and is positioning peace as impossible because of the Connecticut settlers themselves, he does not provide examples of Connecticut’s cruel actions. This may be due to the concise nature of business, yet, as was witnessed in the later writing by Acker, demonstration is best wielded for effect. It seems odd that they would not position a few examples of the contentious behavior in order to bolster their position.

It is in these missing empty spaces that a nefarious narrative can be molded in order to achieve the ends that Pennsylvania set out toward following the Decree of Trenton: the removal of Connecticut settlers. In “othering” them through language, and positioning them as the maligned force clocking legislative attempts at peace, it becomes easy to negotiate their forcible removal to the general public. Thus, Pennsylvania’s actions become underhanded and nefarious, while Connecticut—who has renounced claim and abided by the Continental Congress’ decision, thus far—becomes the more transparent force. This tone is noted within the Editorial Note of the Connecticut-Pennsylvania Territorial Dispute found on the Founders.gov digital archive.

The paper trail that Connecticut cultivates in their petition to the government directly opposes the ways in which Pennsylvania manipulates the language. It breeds an air of question to their point, and underlines the growing anxieties which eventually result in the Third Yankee Pennamite War.  

The Third Yankee Pennamite War

As Pennsylvania sought to strip Connecticut settlers of their status and rights as people in the land, Connecticut fought to retain their rights of self and property. While things remained mostly verbal, violence once again rose in May 1784, when under Patterson’s command, Pennamite troops forcibly removed “one-hundred and fifty” Connecticut families from their homes. Not only did they leave them destitute, with no money, clothes, or food, in their quick removal, but they forced them to “find their way through the wilderness of the Lackawaxen to the Delaware Valley, a distance of about eighty miles” (Gnichtel, The Trenton Decree of 1782).

The settlers of Connecticut had been given notice of their removal six-month prior. Patterson dictated that they were to leave all lands within the Wyoming Valley, and demonstrated what would happen to those families that refused through acts of aggression and property damage. However, the Connecticut settlers continued to advocate for their rights within the land they had purchased. They wrote and petitioned the courts, speaking out against the cruel actions of Pennsylvania.  

We have a letter that documents this tumultuous time for the Connecticut settlers, where Zebulon Butler has received an update and guidance from his lawyer, Roger Sherman.

Item 14.07: Letter from Roger Sherman to Zebulon Butler, 1784 June 15

In the letter, Sherman notes that the Assembly has protected Connecticut settlers in the time of the decision, for it is stated that they should not be “disturbed in their possessions until a decision” has been agreed upon. Jefferson also speaks of this letter in his “Editorial Note,” where he explains the Court’s intention to extend their deliberations:

This letter reveals the Court’s recognition of the struggles of the Connecticut people, while offering an early condemnation of Pennsylvania’s quick action. However, it also possesses a critique of the Susquehanna Company and Connecticut powers, as Sherman notes a question of whether “any assistance” would be given to these offices. It highlights another moment where the people are privileged while the bodies of power are being held liable for their previous actions: elevating liberty while holding strong to the rule of law.

Jefferson’s notes also reveal that despite the federal perspective on the matter, the Court left the ruling to the “desires” of the individual states. Thus granting Pennsylvania the authority to begin the forcible removal of Connecticut citizens. Jefferson’s editorial note also acknowledges this action taken by Pennsylvania was the instigating event that led to the Third, and final, Pennamite war. Jefferson writes:

Patterson’s troops would face a great deal of resistance from those of the settlers who were armed, contending against the Connecticut settlers throughout May 1784; yet, he was mostly successful in causing many to flee or wielding the might of his men against those who stayed. Many of the Connecticut settlers fled the violence of his men, but their departure was brief, as settlers would quickly attempt to make their way back into the area. As word of this reached Patterson and the troops under his command, their actions became more violent and cruel as they drove out the remaining settlers, leading to the deaths of several people due to hunger and hardship as noted by Glicthnel; hey were largely unprepared for exposure to the elements.

Patterson would cause such great havoc and cruelty, that his actions would draw the attention of surrounding states and even the authoritative hand of his own government for the critique that he engendered. Colonel John Armstrong Jr., another influential militant power within the Yankee Pennamite Wars, would later be brought in by the Pennsylvania government in – to return order within the Valley by arresting Patterson for the chaos that he had wrought. 

The Battle of Locust Ridge

In July 1784, Pennsylvania’s Supreme Executive Council ordered the forced removal of Connecticut settlers one final time. On August 1st, under the command of Col. John Armstrong, three hundred and fifteen men in the Pennamite militia marched to the Wyoming Valley to carry out the removal order. They were met near Locust Hill, now Locust Ridge, by a Connecticut militia of thirty men under the command of Captain John Swift after their approach had been heard. The battle was waged over the next day, with many wounded and the death of Pennamite soldier Jacob Everett. Swift’s troops retreated to the Wyoming Valley, intent on defending it against the larger Pennamite force.

Armstrong’s men overpowered the Connecticut militia and demanded the surrender of all within the Valley. In the end, Armstrong’s men bound the hands of Swift’s men and brought them to Easton to be jailed. They also captured forty-two others within the Valley, whom they sent to Sunbury to be jailed, though they were later released on bail. There was a later rescue attempt of the men who followed Swift into battle by Edward Inman, who with brute force alone, broke into the jail and freed the men. However, only fifteen made it back to the Valley safely, while the other eleven were recaptured and tried for the death of Jacob Everett. While the men were tried, the grand jury ignored the charges against the men, and they were later freed, but only after having spent eleven months jailed.

It were these aggressive acts that caused neighboring states such as Vermont to send in aid to those Connecticut citizens as they fled or fought and further stoked the violence and conflict of the Third War. Pennsylvania chose to disregard the structures of the governing body, even though Connecticut would have had a representative within the case, and began the violent and forcible removal of Connecticut settlers. The rights of liberty and security stand prominent in the face of property and politics and direct critique falls upon Pennsylvania.

This was the first instance I noted in my research that the full weight of criticism and rebuke fell on Pennsylvania. It is also the only mention I found of an external state (Vermont) taking part in the action and violence unfolding between Connecticut and Pennsylvania in the conflict. I found myself wondering if it was the matter that Pennsylvania was targeting the people themselves, rather than forces within the debate, that heralded such loud critique, for even their own government was insistent on taking time to consider whether Connecticut settlers should be removed.

Within our collection, there are numerous manuscripts that aim at rectifying the tensions brewing within the conflict. This is particularly true for the period following the Second Pennamite War into the Third. From witness testimonies that critique Pennsylvania’s cruelty toward the Connecticut settlers to the legal Acts presented by Pennsylvania in response to those critiques, the bulk of the Susquehanna Claim subseries demonstrates the power of legal advocacy.

One manuscript in particular stood out to me as I assessed the collection, Item 14.08, which sought to re-establish the land holdings of widowed families of Revolutionary soldiers at Wyoming. The report focuses on granting aid to widows who have experienced loss by restoring the lands their husbands held before the time of their death. The manuscript reveals an intriguing dynamic at play, as it simultaneously works toward peace while positioning that attempt through a social frame, rather than a true act of goodwill. 

Item 14.08: Report by unknown, 1784 September 7

The decision to single out widows and children comes across as intentional. It plays out in both a positive and negative light, for it plays to the notions of family and chivalry alive within the young country’s identity. The document appears to privilege peace above all by protecting those most vulnerable: solitary women and children. However, the language is plain in attempting to remedy the critique of the nation without fully accepting their own accountability. The bill is to reinstate the lands of widows whose families have “fallen fighting against the savages and also of all such others,” placing indigenous tensions at the forefront and following it up with the action they caused without having to name themselves. 

The report, however, highlights another disguised motive for Pennsylvania:

Offering these lands back to the widows of fallen Connecticut men restricted the expansion of those lands as women had limited means of accessing their own wealth or progress in the late 18th century, other than marriage. It was not until the mid-nineteenth century, with the passing of the 1845 Married Women’s Property Act in Pennsylvania, that women had the means to legally control their own property and finances apart from the men they were bound to. Prior to that, whether it be the fathers they were born to or the men they married, their property and autonomy were wholly defined by the male figures within their lives. If those men within her life disappeared, either through death or divorce, the woman was often left destitute; all of her property became subsumed upon reciting her vows and taking her husband’s hand in marriage.

Thus, an intriguing legal protection that was born from this reality was the formation of the Widow’s Dower. A dower, different from a dowry, offered financial protection for women on the death of their husbands. Yet, even these protections left women incredibly vulnerable in the face of a patriarchal society. The document, while considered a “life-estate,” only recognized a woman’s hold over “one-third of the husband’s real property if there were children and one half if there were not,” and was a means of replicating the stability and care her living husband would have provided had he been present (Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History).

“It was meant only to provide for the wife as her husband would have done had he lived, under a legal system that recognized her position of dependency within the family. When a widow died, her dower lands descended automatically to her husband’s heirs or to his creditors”

(Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History).

The dower, in its conception, was a means of entitling married women to the rights of their land obtained through marriage. It was a way to stabilize the matriarchs of the family who were responsible for rearing their children left behind in the wake of their husband’s death. However, these dowers only recognized that protection within a narrow frame. 

The dower manuscript of Sarah Challis dates back to 1751 and presents an early depiction of the struggle women faced in maintaining security and autonomy for themselves. The manuscript notes the necessity of a male voice to position Challis’ case before the Court, demonstrating the ways in which she upheld her duty and sold the property entitled to her upon her marriage. It is helpful in illuminating the methods in which women had to mold their arguments to fit within the frame and rhetoric of the time. The 1803 manuscript of Abigail Adams, wife of  John Adams, the 2nd President of the United States and mother of John Quincy Adams, the 6th President of the United States, illustrates the depth of the vulnerability women faced during the period. Abigail Adams during her life was considered a largely intellectual and influential voice, even within her marriage. She was said to have been a close and trusted advisor to her husband and an active influence in shaping the founding tenants of the country as we recognize them today, privileging liberty, autonomy, and an early feminist voice in stressing to her husband to “remember the ladies and be more generous and favourable to them than your ancestors” (Britannica). Yet, her manuscript notes the ease in which even the most respected and influential women may have these minor protections and rights waived or surrendered while under the influence of the male “advocate.” In Adams’ marriage agreement, Abigail is said to have surrendered her assurances to any thirds within the premises of her husband’s land:

The vulnerability of women during this era is further noted by the dower’s protection which heavily depending upon the male advocate to not only be created—an agreement between both her husband and the law officials such as their notary and lawyer—but also to be accepted by the man who contends for her rights within the Court after her husband has passed. There is even a final method for these male figures within her life to play the advocate and hero, for the only “solvent [a] husband could leave his widow more than dower if he chose to” would be to intentional name her head of  “his entire estate in fee simple (absolute ownership)” (Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History). It is a power that, at once, offered protection while still stiffly defined that protection and autonomy through a patriarchal lens.

An interesting component of this practice that stood out to me, however, especially within the framework of the Yankee Pennamite Conflict, was the ways in which land equated power. The protection afforded women was not political, social, or even personal power, but a specified space with which to sustain oneself. The “[d]ower was a legal tradition carried over from colonial days…[where] property rights were meant to support the family as a unit. They worked reasonably well in an economic system based on landed wealth, under which families typically stayed in one place and rarely sold or mortgaged their farms” (Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History).

This emphasis on land led me to consider Pennsylvania’s motives more complexly, where Connecticut widows in the Wyoming Valley would likely pursue any means of stability after losing both their home and husbands. If they sought to secure themselves through marriage, they would essentially become Pennsylvanian citizens, as the only options available to them would be Pennsylvanian men. In turn, having even minimal sections of land would entice Pennsylvania settlers, as it would mimic a sort of dowry—a piece of power within the Valley. The end result works in the favor of Pennsylvania, costing them the least, while assuaging their public face. 

Another factor which may have influenced Pennsylvania’s decision to establish peace and stability among Connecticut citizens within the Wyoming Valley was the resigning of The Treaty of Fort Stanwix with the Six Nations in 1784. With the success of the American Revolution, the U.S. government sought to expand their western borders and monopolize upon the lands. Through the Fort Stanwix negotiations, they secured among other territories, “a vast region in western Pennsylvania, representing one-fourth of the total area of the modern state” (Britannica). 

External Critique and Pennsylvania’s Pick of Peace

As noted, the inhumane treatment of Connecticut citizens drew attention from surrounding states, as they responded with like manpower, and emboldened conflict for many years following. In response to the critique and force they experienced, the Assembly sought a way to soothe over the growing tensions and prevent another war. In 1786, the assembly asked Timothy Pickering to mitigate peace between the Connecticut and Pennamite citizens, as he had previously purchased his own land within Northern Pennsylvania and sought to force his recognition of Connecticut claims to the land. Pickering represented Luzerne County at the 1787 convention that ratified the Constitution, where he spoke for the unification of the two and toward the creation of a peace treaty. 

There are numerous mentions of Pickering within the collection, both written to and by him. However, the most intriguing of them in my search within the collection was Item 14.12, where he notes his concerns in the early stages of reformation and peace. For a man who worked a greater part of his later life in mitigating impressive moments of negotiation and resolution, to see him irritated at the current state of a governing body and worried about its ability in moving forward is wholly humanizing.

Item 14.12: Letter from Timothy Pickering to “His Excellency The President of the State”, 1787 June 25

We can see in Pickering’s letter how he is still trying to navigate a fragile and young political system. His concern illustrates the reality and growing awareness of a newly formed government assessing the faults within the old systems and its attempt to build a stronger, more impactful framework that would defend against the tyranny they saw under Great Britain. While there may have been early frustrations and setbacks to peace, the interest toward a just and right government is prominent within Pickering’s letter, and emphasizes the real work that many were doing to create lasting peace within the Wyoming Valley. Item 14.14 within the collection is a legal act which sought to establish legal rights that would support and protect Connecticut claimants during and overseeing their land claims.

Item 14.14: “A further act for quieting the disturbances at Wyoming, and for confirming to certain persons called Connecticut claimants, the lands by them claimed with the county of Luzerne,”, copied by Jacob Shallus, 1788, March 27

This legal act builds upon the framework set about by the earlier widower manuscript. It states an intention of reinstating ownership to Connecticut settlers who had been wrongfully removed from their property following the Decree of Trenton. It also holds the Pennsylvanian citizenry accountable for the success of this document, by explicitly addressing what would occur if such settlers held the deed or survey of the land in question. The act offers some form of control and voice to the Connecticut settlers following the instability and violence following the Decree of Trenton in stipulating that, upon a Connecticut settler’s ability to prove prior ownership of the land, all other holdings or interest in the land would be “void:”

The act demonstrates that Connecticut’s settlers may not only retrieve the land they fought and bled for, but Pennsylvania citizens who must relinquish land due to the Act will be compensated for their losses. The language within the Act holds the governing bodies of Pennsylvania at fault.

Over the next decade, from 1790 to 1800, the path toward resolution remained tumultuous. While some sought to remedy the strain through accountability and legislation, others fought for a complete separation between the two states. There are a great number of perspectives within the collection that detail how taxing this social climate was for both sides.

Item 14.15: Letter from David Brearley to Timothy Pickering, 1790 March 4.

Brearly’s letter is an interesting one, as it notes the peoples’ recognition of the governing body’s responsibility for the bloodshed, grief, and losses that occurred during the Third Yankee Pennamite War. This letter speaks back to that of Sherman’s letter to Pickering, where the assembled body stressed quieting the people of their possessions while the case was ongoing. However, Pennsylvania sent in men such as Patterson and Armstrong to further their interests. This pressure and injustice then, as Brearly notes, led to the inevitable “Civil War.” Brearly’s letter demonstrates the severity felt by the Third War, as it continues to be in the central frame of the citizenry. In addressing the ways in which the government has failed before, Brearly’s letter in the new decade emphasizes the importance of peace among the people.

However, just as often as there was a peaceful voice within the period, there was an equally loud, violent one to contend against. Those original tensions that led Pennsylvania to respond narrowly following the Decree of Trenton were still alive within some, and the pain suffered at the hands of Connecticut’s forces were still largely felt. This led to resentment and anger toward Connecticut; an anger that seems to extend beyond those in power to the individual settler. 

Item 14.18: Meeting minutes by Putnam Catlin, 1793 March 4

In Item 14.18, Putnam Catlin catalogs the minutes of a meeting for the Representatives of the Connecticut claimants. Catlin’s minutes note an “additional sum of Six hundred & thirty dollars be immediately levied on the Connecticut claimants” for their participation in the Susquehanna Controversy. The position of this item depicts the ways in which peace is a nonlinear event, as its tone heavily contrasts the previous source, Brearly’s letter, even though it is dated only a few years prior. Though there were many people who advocated for the brokering of peace, there were equally those who felt the tensions of the Controversy had not yet been settled.

This is an interesting perspective that the collection offers, for a large portion of it follows the years after the final war. One would imagine that many of these documents would follow similar veins of unification and reparation, as the wars themselves are officially over. Yet, the collection expands upon our comprehension of the period’s social climate. It demonstrates why peace and compromise took nearly fifteen years to achieve after the recognized surrender of the Third Yankee Pennamite War. In this stretch of time that sought prompt resolution for lasting peace, there were many who still harbored resentment and grief following decades of brutal violence and displacement. 

Item 14.21: “An act to prevent intrusions of Lands within the Counties of Northampton, Northumberland & Luzerne” and “An Act supplementary…” passed the 11th April 1795” copied by Samuel A. Law, ca 1795 April 1

We see this resentment further demonstrated in Item 14.21, which was an act designed to remove Connecticut settlers from Northampton, Northumberland, Luzerne, Wayne, and Lycoming counties. In the act, those who are found guilty of infringing upon its varying sections are liable to face imprisonment or steep fines. The act also delineates how the fines will be used, and speaks to the creation of a police force with the singular purpose of apprehending Connecticut settlers. The act, in short, criminalizes the Connecticut settler, creating an air in which they put themselves on the line or abide by it with their removal. It is incredibly narrowing, and works to build upon the tensions that Catlin’s earlier language reignited within the controversy. 

Yet, while there is a strong position taken against Connecticut in this manuscript, the collection provides a healing voice to remedy it.

The End of the Controversy: The Compromise of 1799

The Susquehanna Controversy finally saw its resolution in 1799 with the Compromise Act. Prior to the Third Yankee Pennamite War, within the late 1780s, a committee was formed to work on a legislative piece that would aid or expedite peace negotiations between Pennsylvania and Connecticut. It is plausible that the planning for such a prospect was long, arduous, and repetitive, for it sought to soothe the unfolding tensions that resulted in three wars over the last couple of decades.

The bulk of the important documents seen within the subseries were created after the end of the Third Yankee Pennamite War, and reveal an intriguing glimpse into the legal and social aftermath felt in the years following these violent conflicts. Through a legal lens afforded by the collection, researchers and interested parties have a better insight into the turmoil that continued to brew for decades.

Item 14.29: “An Act for offering compensation to the Susquehanna claimants of certain Lands within the seventeen Townships in the County of Luzerne and for other purposes therein mentioned”, copied by unknown, ca. 1799 April 4

As the title of this act suggests, this act provided uprooted Connecticut settlers with a chance to repurchase the land that had been stripped from them. The Act works through purely economical language, measuring the cost of each claimant by placing their land within one of three categories by the Board of Property; first, second, or third class land. Although the act does not mention how this categorization worked, it notes that those who had lost lands found to be classed in the first categorization would pay eight annual installments of five dollars per acre, the second class land claims would pay eight annual installments of three dollars per acre, and third class would pay eight annual installments one dollar and fifty cents per acre. 

We see a possible, similar critique of the legislation in this Act that was noted within the widower’s manuscript earlier. The Act positions peace and compromise as the forefront of its intention. It paints a light of hope and calm after nearly thirty years of strife, infighting, and dispossession. Superficially, granting Connecticut settlers the chance to retrieve their lands is positive; however, one must recall the fact that the Pennsylvania governing bodies sent their militia’s to forcibly remove these settlers from their lands against the position of the Court in 1784. Moreover, their actions were considered to work blatantly against the frame of the Decree of Trenton, as Jefferson noted. Thus, this act becomes once again a social move, designed to present the face of peace with the least cost to Pennsylvania powers.

The copy that we have within the Gilbert Stuart McClintock special collection appears to be an earlier version of the final Act passed by Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court, for while our document lists the three classes of compensation as noted above, the finalized act lists four.

The finalized Act states that, 

“By the 5th section of this act the commissioners are directed to ascertain all the rights, or lots within the said seventeen townships, which were occupied or acquired by Connecticut claimants who -were actually settlers there at or before the time the decree at Trenton, and which rights or lots were particularly assigned to the said settlers prior to the said decree, agreeably to the regulations then in among force them, and to divide the rights or lots into four classes, to be distinguished in the manner herein before-mentioned, according to their respective value, taking into consideration both the quality and situation, and to make out a certificate thereof with a draft of the survey thereto annexed, and in case the said original settlers…agree to pay to the commonwealth by eight equal annual instalments [sic] at the rate of two dollars per acre.” 

The four classes defined were:

“For lands of the first class; at the rate of one dollar twenty cents per acre, for lands of the second class ; at the rate of fifty cents per acre, for lands of the third class; and at the rate of eight and one-third cents per acre, for lands of the fourth class, with interest upon each installment till the same be paid.”

Essentially, the deed retrievals would be conducted as such:

First Class Lands would pay eight equal annual installments at $2/acre

Second Class Lands would pay eight equal annual installments at $1.20/acre

Third Class Lands would pay eight equal annual installments at .50 Cents/acre

Fourth Class Lands would pay eight equal annual installments at 8.66 Cents/acre

All repayment accounts would receive interest on their totals until the account was paid in full.

In the final version of the Act, Connecticut settlers were charged a great deal less for their deed retrievals than in the initial draft. Those within the first class demonstrate the discrepancies quite dramatically, varying from the recipient paying eight installments of five dollars per acre initially to now paying two dollars per acre.

While reading through the two versions of the Act, I started to consider whether the reduction rate was a purposeful act made by Pennsylvania in an attempt to assuage the criticism and conflict that fell upon their actions preceding the Third War. The Act positions peace as the main motivation. However, the only true beneficiary without cost is the Assembly itself. Connecticut citizens may retrieve their lands, if they have sufficient proof of their previous holdings, but only after having paid a great sum for lands that were robbed of them. Moreover, they accrue interest on their accounts until they have been paid in full. As for the Pennsylvanian citizens, they lost any lands or claims they had been holding before the Connecticut claimant came forth. Yet, even they fare better than the Connecticut citizens in this, for the money the Connecticut settlers pay on the land is used through the Act to pay off Pennsylvania inconvenience at having lost the land. The people themselves are the ones who shoulder the weight of this compromise, while the governing bodies deflect accountability once more. It is a weight, I would argue, that was felt widely by the people and possibly advocate voices within the Assembly, for the drastic changes to the Connecticut accounts demonstrate a recognition of pushback and correction. It is this tension that continues to unfold throughout the new century, as we see a young government interacting with their citizens.

A New Era: The Years Following the End of the Controversy

The years following the 1799 Compromise are incredibly dynamic, which may be perplexing to say for some once we have reached peace. However, that is just the thing, what does life look like when it has taken nearly thirty years to arrive at it? A pattern I noticed when looking through the following items within the collection was an intentional separation between the people of Connecticut and the larger powers that played a formative role in the controversy and conflict. Many of the following items within the collection detail Connecticut’s intentional movements toward resolution in the wake of peace and the poetic justice that befell the Susquehanna Company when brought before the law. 

Arriving in 1800, the first major action and development in the new century is that Connecticut fully renounces their claim on the lands named within King Charles II’s original grant.

Item 14:24: Legal Act, titled “An ACT renouncing the Claims of this State to certain Lands therein mentioned.” Copied by Samuel Wyllys, 1800 May 8

An interesting note to the history of this act was that it was passed twice. The first time was within the Congress of the United States in Philadelphia, who, in 1799, discussed and oversaw a majority of the act delineating features. It was passed in that same gathering in 1799 by Congress, however, they left Connecticut to pass it themselves within their General Assembly. The tensions were still alive between Connecticut and Pennsylvania during this time that the United States’ young, plausibly vulnerable, governing structures sought some control in supervising the construction of this Act in Philadelphia, where they held the greater seat of power. Though largely held and formed by the General Assembly, their intention was not to overshadow Connecticut in their presence, but to foster unions of peace amid pervasive, rooted tension.

Although this Act did not have an immediate impact on the citizens themselves, the years following its passing saw the Susquehanna and Delaware Companies losing legitimacy to their land claims. In the collection, Item 14.26 shares the final nail in the Susquehanna Company’s proverbial coffin.

Item 14.26: Letter from Timothy Pitkin to Colonel Wadsworth, 1801 February 17.

This item in particular may be my favorite in the collection for the poetic irony it grants the modern day researcher. In this letter from Timothy Pitkin to Colonel Wadsworth, Piktin notes that the Courts have found the documents presented by the Companies “void or not obligatory.” Piktin writes that present Courts “have determined that the certificates of the pretended Clerks of [those] Companies, were no evidence in Courts, and would not permit them to be read as [such], on the Trials.” In short, the Susquehanna Company falls short in their initial goals of settling within the land because they have worked within their own rules, appointing clerks within their own ranks to deem what is permissible and what is not. However, in this newly developing country with a burgeoning government of its own, their documents hold no weight, for they are wholly internal.

Moreover, the people and governing bodies of Connecticut have renounced the Susquehanna Company. They are considered to be self-appointed, “self-created” forms that hold no form within the government of the United States. Piktin simply says it best when he asks Wadsworth, “IF [these] Companies are [so] little [respected] in Connecticut, What weight can any pretence of title under them have in [Pennsylvania]?”

While it would feel satisfying to leave the history here, simplicity has never been history’s strong suit. The complexity and growth of it continues regardless of whatever victories or losses one may see, and in truth, offers a more rounded insight to the climate we inhabit in our own days. For, in the face of peace, unity, and the underdog’s victory, the collection offers one more insight into the vulnerability of peace in a country that has barely emerged in its own name.

After fighting had been sustained for decades, it would be naive to believe that peace was naturally fostered or easily sustained in the new century. In fact, it appears as if the space afforded by peace granted those critiquing voices the space to formulate their arguments. The American Revolution had previously offered a brief window of unity and peace, but that was framed within the realm of a larger discord. What does this new world look like in a landscape that still wears a history of conflict and controversy?

Item 14.27: Legal act signed by Thomas McKean, 1801 April 14.

Thomas McKean, founding father and a noted political voice of the nineteenth century, displayed the ways in which the conflict persisted within the Wyoming Valley and its people. McKean begins his proclamation by referring to another former act passed that aligns with his interests concerning Connecticut and Pennsylvanian relations in his day. He refers to the 1795 “Act to Prevent Intrusions…” which not only alienated and removed Connecticut citizens within the Valley, but further weaponized those Pennsylvania citizens within the Valley as well. His point highlights the regressive nature of conversations of peace and power, where those who seek a stronger foundational power will refer back to moments where they benefited from a structure less developed. In his proposal, McKean advocates for and demands the withdrawal of Connecticut settlers through enactments of law, and empowers fellow Pennsylvanians to “prevent” Connecticut’s continued presence and “prosecute” them when required by the law. 

In quoting McKean, the act aimed at “hereby forbidding all future intrusions on lands within the limits of the said counties of Wayne, Northampton, Luzerne, Northumberland, and Lycoming; and enjoining and requiring all persons who have intruded on any lands, contrary to the provisions of the said first recited act, to withdraw peaceably from the lands whereon such intrusions have been made. And all officers of the government, and all good citizens of the commonwealth, are further hereby required and enjoined to prevent, or to [prosecute] by any legal means, [such intrusions] and intruders; and to render, in their several capacities, the [most] prompt and effectual aid for carrying into full execution the provisions of the [said] recited [acts] of the General [Assembly].”

An act such as this to follow greater movements of peace underscores the vulnerability of the United States’ newly birthed government system, one that aims to separate itself from the restrictive nature of the British Monarchy and fight for individual liberty. This regressive tone by McKean highlights the warring tensions between the need for brute force and singular rule in the face of legitimacy and unity. 

Even in 1802, thirty-three years after the Susquehanna Company sent its first forty settlers into the Wyoming Valley, after three consecutive wars and numerous legislative acts toward peace, the tensions of that early Controversy and Conflict are felt within the people. McKean’s insistence, even removed from the immediate conflict and question of the land demonstrates how peace was, and would continue to be, an ever-evolving act that requires the attention and efforts of all involved. It also requires accessibility to important collections, such as the Gilbert Stuart McClintock collection. For, how are we to learn from and foster peace in a history largely forgotten? 

If there was one takeaway I could emphasize for those interacting with the Susquehanna Claim, 1770-1801 subseries of the Gilbert Stuart McClintock collection, it would be the depth of what we have yet to know about our own histories. There is a world of tension, identity, conflict, and peace within this singular collection that opens up a door into a history mostly forgotten. The Yankee Pennamite Wars not only spanned nearly thirty years, saw multiple political advancements, and even a strong influence within the crux of the American Revolution, yet,  more often than not people are unaware of the fact that Pennsylvania and Connecticut were ever embattled within a violent and grieving controversy. Finding myself at the end of this collection, it would bring me great joy if even one more person became lost in learning about this piece of our history, as I have during my time with it. As someone who has grown up in the area, I found the history within the Susquehanna Claim collection consistently drawing me to the edge of my seat, astonished at the possibility of having been born in Connecticut in a different time.